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When is a political institution legitimate? Political philosophers on the one hand, and 
social scientists on the other, tend to approach that question differently. Philosophers 
typically appeal to the normative properties of the institution in question. They may claim 
that an institution is legitimate when it is instrumental to the realisation of some 
substantive end1; or they may claim that legitimacy is a procedural matter, being solely 
dependent upon, for instance, democratic procedures of some variety2; or procedural and 
substantive concerns may be combined, as when it is supposed that legitimacy requires 
democracy and ² or indeed, because ² the latter produces the best or correct results3; or 
legitimacy might be said to depend on an institution meeting a wider range of pre-
requisites, such as, for instance, the provision of basic human rights internally, and a 
´PLQLPDO external justice UHTXLUHPHQWµ with respect to interaction with other institutions.4  
By contrast, social scientists typically understand legitimacy descriptively. Here, an 
LQVWLWXWLRQ·V (il)legitimacy is determined by the attitudes, and beliefs about, that persons 
actually have with respect to it.5 Legitimacy so understood is of interest due to its practical 
 
1 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
2 Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Fabienne Peter, Democratic 
Legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
3 David Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
4 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
5 Legitimacy understood in this sense can then be ´PHDVXUHGµ See, for example: Margaret Levi, Audrey 
Sacks and Tom Tyler, ´&RQFHSWXDOL]LQJ Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating %HOLHIVµ American Behavioral 
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import for the stable functioning of an institution: if people believe that, for example, their 
state is legitimate, then that state will be able to function more easily than if there exists 
no such belief. Descriptive legitimacy can therefore be conceived dispassionately as an 
alternative to (for example) bare coercion, or alignment with SHUVRQV· self-interest, as an 
enabler of the coordination of political action; various ¶OHJLWLPDWLRQ QDUUDWLYHV· might 
produce such legitimacy beliefs in the relevant population.6    
 This paper, while a work of normative political philosophy, takes seriously 
OHJLWLPDF\·V sociological dimension and practical import.7 It endeavours to bridge the gap 
between a purely descriptive view of DJHQWV· beliefs concerning legitimacy and the simple 
application of the SKLORVRSKHU·V own normative criteria, offering an account of how the 
legitimacy criteria that are to apply to a given institution can both normatively regulate it 
and, at the same time, practically support the LQVWLWXWLRQ·V functioning. It does so by way 
of critical engagement with Allen %XFKDQDQ·V recent work, proceeding from which we set 
out a new view about how the derivation of legitimacy criteria ought to be sensitive to 
existing political circumstances; we call this ¶FRQWH[W-GHSHQGHQFH· The context in question 
 
Scientist 53(3) (2009): 354 ² 375; Stephen Weatherford, ´0HDVXULQJ Political /HJLWLPDF\µ American Political 
Science Review 86(1) (1992): 149-166. 
6 Craig Matheson, ´:HEHU and the Classification of Forms of /HJLWLPDF\µ The British Journal of Sociology 
38(2) (1987): 199-215.  
7 It is of course not the first to do this in some way. For one prominent example, Jürgen +DEHUPDV·V work 
has emphasised the role of both normative standards and historical actualisation to a proper understanding 
of legitimacy (and justice). More recently, Thomas Fossen has articulated a pragmatic approach which 
understands legitimacy as ´D piece of practical, political vocabulary that enables subjects to articulate and 
dispute their political stances with RWKHUVµ ´ 7DNLQJ Stances, Contesting Commitments: Political Legitimacy 
and the Pragmatic 7XUQµ Journal of Political Philosophy 21(4) (2013): 426-450, at 446. Rejecting a 
¶QRUPDWLYLVW· view in which legitimacy criteria can be established objectively and in abstraction, Fossen 
understands the distinction between what is legitimate and what is merely taken to be legitimate to be a 
matter of individual perspective. As will be seen, the approach we endorse here similarly eschews the 
possibility of the abstract philosophical discovery of legitimacy criteria, and also emphasises the role of social 
practice. However, we make no appeal to a philosophy of pragmatism, and nor do we take a necessarily 
agonistic view of things. Finally, some theorists, like Raz, suggest that de facto authority is a necessary 
condition (one among several) of an authority being legitimate in practice. But Raz does not say that varying 
empirical realities ought to condition the way in which normative legitimacy criteria are derived, as we do 
here.  
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is the political decision context, that is, the political context from within which a social 
process of convergence upon legitimacy criteria is to occur. 
 In what follows, we first explicate and broadly endorse %XFKDQDQ·V 
¶0etacoordination View· of institutional legitimacy. In this view, the political 
SKLORVRSKHU·V role is not unilaterally to settle the question of when an institution ought to 
be considered legitimate, but is instead to provide guidance for how a social process of 
seeking agreement on legitimacy criteria should proceed. Social convergence upon 
legitimacy criteria is what Buchanan calls metacoordination, and we will correspondingly 
refer to the practice of seeking convergence as the metacoordination process, and the 
convergence itself as the metacoordination outcome. Our primary concern in this paper is 
with metacoordination process. We understand that process to be underspecified in two 
ways, which we set out in the second section: (i) which agents are to be involved in the 
pursuit of legitimacy criteria for a given institution (constituency); and (ii) within which 
normative bounds (normativity). 
 Both of these dimensions of the metacoordination process admit of differing 
potential specifications along an ordinal scale of demandingness. For metacoordination 
constituency this is a scale of demandingness of inclusion; how many agents, of what type, 
ought to be party to the metacoordination process? For normativity it is a scale of 
normative demandingness; how rigorous ought the normative constraints on the 
metacoordination process to be? Our main claim and intellectual contribution, in the third 
section of this paper, is that these dimensions of the metacoordination process in any one 
instance ought to be sensitive to the political decision context from within which the 
process is to occur. We highlight three relevant contextual elements (without supposing 
that these will be the only three of relevance): criticality; institutional time point; and the 
motivational landscape. For each element, we offer an illustrative real-world example, 
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focussed on a specific international or global governance institution, and show how that 
element might rightly condition one or both dimensions of the metacoordination process. 
The fact that we use international and global governance institutions as the main 
examples to elucidate context-dependence is no accident. Doing so throws into relief the 
fact that the state is just one, peculiar kind of political institution among others, not a 
master institution in the image of which all conceptions of legitimacy ought to be built. 
The political decision contexts from within which legitimacy criteria for international 
institutions have to be socially derived will often be different to that of states. To illustrate, 
the level of public interest in international institutions is often far lower than citi]HQV· 
interest in their own states. International institutions are also often sui generis in character, 
with a clear recent genesis, allowing us to reflect upon the time before (and after) they 
existed. Both of these things, as we will argue, are relevant to how legitimacy criteria ought 
to be derived. This is not, however, to say that context-dependence is relevant only to the 
legitimacy of international institutions; on the contrary, context-dependence is part of a 
general theory of institutional legitimacy.  
 To be entirely clear at the outset: this paper is not addressing the first-order question 
¶:KDW are the appropriate legitimacy criteria for a specific LQVWLWXWLRQ"· Rather, it argues 
that there are different ways in which the political decision context can affect the way in 
which the metacoordination process (which does answer the first-order question) should 
be conducted. Developing the idea of metacoordination by way of context-dependence 
has the implication that differing approaches to deriving legitimacy criteria (i.e. differently 
shaped processes of metacoordination) might be enjoined for two institutions that are very 
similar ² even identical ² in terms of their institutional capacities and function, depending 
on the political decision context that pertains when legitimacy criteria are being sought.  
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I. THE ¶0(7$&225',1$7,21 9,(:· OF LEGITIMACY  
According to Allen Buchanan, theories of legitimacy have to date ´EHHQ chiefly 
preoccupied with the legitimacy of only one kind of institution ² and quite a peculiar one 
at that ² the VWDWHµ8 Indeed, philosophers have been so preoccupied that they have often 
been minded to define legitimacy as ¶WKH right to UXOH· even though defining legitimacy in 
this way overlooks the fact that other political institutions either do not rule in the same 
coercive, exclusionary way as states, or indeed do not rule at all, but rather, for instance, 
only make recommendations. Buchanan therefore claims that ´ WKHRULVWV have not squarely 
addressed the task of developing a general account of institutional OHJLWLPDF\µ9 
 %XFKDQDQ·V ´ 0HWDFRRUGLQDWLRQ 9LHZµ of legitimacy is his contribution to this task. 
He contends that ´WKHUH is a general concept of institutional legitimacy that applies across 
a wide range of cases and provides significant guidance for developing more specific 
conceptions of legitimacyµ.10 That general concept 
includes two key ideas. First, the distinct practical role of legitimacy judgements is that 
they serve to solve a metacoordination problem: How to converge on public standards that 
institutions are to meet if we are to accord them the peculiar standing that they must have 
if they are to supply the coordination needed to achieve important benefit or avoid serious 
costs, and accomplish this without excessive costs. Second, this problem is to be solved in 
circumstances in which we should expect more of institutions than that they provide some 
benefits relative to the noninstitutional alternative but in which it would be unreasonable 
to expect them to be either fully just or optimally efficacious in producing the benefits they 
are designed to deliver.11  
 
8 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 174.   
9 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights: 174-76. See also N. P. Adams, ´,QVWLWXWLRQDO /HJLWLPDF\µ Journal of 
Political Philosophy 26(1) (2018): 84-102.   
10 Ibid: 176. 
11 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights: 178. 
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By ¶SHFXOLDU VWDQGLQJ· Buchanan means ´EHLQJ recognised, in a social practice, as 
commanding certain forms of UHVSHFWµ.12 Being afforded this social respect offers a crucial 
practical benefit: it allows the institution in question to carry out its particular function 
without excessive costs, moral or practical.  
The Metacoordination View understands the process of arriving at criteria of 
legitimacy to be a necessarily social practice; metacoordination refers to public convergence 
on standards of legitimacy that can ground social respect for an institution. 13  The 
determination of legitimacy criteria (the metacoordination outcome) arises from this social 
practice (the metacoordination process). Thus, we can say that in the Metacoordination 
View, not only is there no uniform conception of legitimacy discoverable in abstraction 
that applies across institutional contexts, there is in fact no determinate conception of 
legitimacy that applies to any given institution prior to this social practice occurring and 
terminating in convergence on such a conception.14  
Legitimacy thus understood is, however, not simply equivalent to a ¶VRFLRORJLFDO· 
descriptive understanding ² it is not the case that just any social convergence will do. Here 
the philosopher enters: 
On this understanding of what legitimacy is about, the goal for the philosopher, after an 
initial clarification of the social role of legitimacy assessments, is to contribute to the 
development or maintenance of morally defensible social practices of assessing legitimacy 
for various types of important institutions.15  
 
12 Ibid: 180. 
13 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights: 180.  
14 Buchanan offers a list of ¶FRXQWLQJ SULQFLSOHV· for the legitimacy of any institution. Yet the criteria are not 
determinate in two ways: a) they are not necessary conditions; and b) which criteria are more relevant for 
which kind of institution is left open. The counting principles are, in our view, best understood as principles 
for metacoordination constituents themselves potentially to consider, and to reject or endorse as they see fit 
in specific instances (within normative constraints, to be explained below).  
15 Heart of Human Rights: 180. 
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The role of the philosopher, then, is not to offer a unilateral account of when a given 
institution is or LVQ·W legitimate, but is rather to provide a framework for metacoordination 
processes of assessing legitimacy.16  
This framework for morally defensible practices of metacoordination is however 
underspecified in %XFKDQDQ·V account in two main ways, which we explicate in the next 
section. Before moving on to that task, we should underline what we understand to be 
motivating the Metacoordination View ² a motivation that we share ourselves ² namely a 
commitment to the practical import of concepts and conceptions in political morality. 
From this perspective, normative political concepts are understood to have practical 
political functions; where a definition of a political concept does not fulfil this practical 
function, it is not an appropriate definition of that concept. Similarly, particular 
conceptions ought to be consistent with the concept fulfilling that function if they are to 
be appropriate conceptions of that concept. As an example of what this means, we can 
refer first to ¶SUDFWLFH-GHSHQGHQW· theories of justice which, we suggest, take this kind of 
practical view. 17 Practice-dependent theorists emphasise that their approach is enjoined in 
 
16 A question then arises about quite how to understand this role. Is the philosopher now simply settling the 
metacoordination question unilaterally, rather than the first order legitimacy question? That would 
seemingly be at odds with the practical perspective that the ¶PHWDFRRUGLQDWLRQ YLHZ· adopts (and which we 
articulate imminently). The alternative ² which we prefer ² is that to reflect upon the practice of 
metacoordination is to contribute to a ¶meta-metacoordination· process. Such a process, occurring among 
an inevitably limited constituency, is of course itself highly unlikely to impact upon the way 
metacoordination occurs in practice. This is a reality that confronts all theory that aspires to be ¶DFWLRQ-
JXLGLQJ· however, rather than a problem unique to the Metacoordination View. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for raising this issue.  
17 For the debate on practice-dependence about justice, see, for example: Aaron James, ´ &RQVWUXFWLQJ Justice 
for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status 4XRµ Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(3) (2005): 281-316; Andrea 
Sangiovanni, ´-XVWLFH and the Priority of Politics to 0RUDOLW\µ Journal of Political Philosophy 16(2) (2008): 
137-164; Miriam Ronzoni, ´7KH Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent 
$FFRXQWµ Philosophy and Public Affairs 37(3) (2009): 229-256; Laura Valentini, ´*OREDO Justice and Practice-
Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, )XQFWLRQDOLVPµ Journal of Political Philosophy 19(4) (2011): 
399-418; Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ´7KH Practice-Dependence Red Herring and Better Reasons for 
Restricting the Scope of -XVWLFHµ Raisons Politiques 51 (2013): 97-120; Andrea Sangiovanni, ´+Rw Practices 
0DWWHUµ Journal of Political Philosophy 24(1) 2016: 3-23; Robert Jubb, ´ ·5HFRYHU it from the Facts as we Know 
7KHP· Practice-'HSHQGHQFH·V 3UHGHFHVVRUVµ Journal of Moral Philosophy 13(1) (2016): 77-99; Eva Erman 
and Niklas Müller, ´ :KDW Distinguishes the Practice-Dependent Approach to -XVWLFH"· Philosophy and Social 
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order to develop principles of justice that are ´QRUPDWLYH for us, in our current world 
historical situDWLRQµ.18 In other words: the concept of justice includes the practical function 
of offering plausible ¶DFWLRQ-JXLGDQFH· for existing political agents; given this, conceptions 
of justice ought then to be practice-dependent, concentrating on the political practices that 
actually exist, the functions they perform, and the way they are actually understood by 
their participants. Aaron -DPHV·V practice-dependent approach, for example, is motivated 
explicitly by a concern with such ´FUHGLELOLW\ of DGGUHVVµ: where the concept of justice is 
understood as having a practical function, one will be open, in the development of specific 
conceptions, to limiting the ´FULWLFDO GHSWKµ of those conceptions (by, for example, taking 
as axiomatic the existence of certain practices) in order to optimise that credibility.19 
This practical attitude, we suggest, also characterises the Metacoordination View 
of legitimacy, and will inform the idea of context-dependence (importantly different from 
practice-dependence) to be explicated in this paper. Legitimacy judgements have a 
´GLVWLQFW practical UROHµ20 ² i.e. the provision to institutions of the social respect necessary 
for them to function effectively ² and express ´D compromise between the need to have a 
functioning institution and the desire to impose normative requirements on it.µ21 The 
emphasis upon the social process of metacoordination is borne of this practical concern: an 
offering of respect to an institution will after all only play its practical role where that 
offering is widely enough endorsed. It is for this reason that ´>W@KH primary question when 
legitimacy judgements are at stake is not whether I (or you) should take a certain stance 
 
Criticism 42(1) (2016): 3-23; Eva Erman and Niklas Müller, ´+RZ Practices do not 0DWWHUµ Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy (forthcoming). 
18 James, ´:K\ 3UDFWLFHVµ 48. See also Ayelet Benai, Christan Schemmel and Miriam Ronzoni, ´*OREDO 
and Social Justice: The Possibility of Social Justice Beyond States in a World of Overlapping 3UDFWLFHVµ in 
Benai, Schemmel and Ronzoni (eds.) Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2011): 46-60. 
19 Aaron James, ´5HSO\ to &ULWLFVµ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2) (2014):286²304, at 289. 
20 Heart of Human Rights: 178. 
21 Ibid: 195. 
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toward an institution; it is whether we ought to regard the institution as having a certain 
VWDQGLQJµ22  
We can describe this practical function of legitimacy as that of an ¶HQDEOLQJ 
FRQVWUDLQW·. Legitimacy constrains institutions by setting out normative criteria that must 
be met before institutions are offered social respect; and legitimacy also plays an enabling 
role, because when institutions are offered that social respect, they can likely function more 
efficiently than with recourse only to bare coercion or appeal to self-interest. Taking 
sufficiently seriously the enabling dimension of legitimacy entails that legitimacy criteria 
for varying institutions ought to be realised by social metacoordination processes, and 
moreover, so we will argue, entails paying attention to the varying ¶SROLWLFDO decision 
FRQWH[WV· within which such social practices are to occur.  
Disagreements will continue to rein about the defensibility of the practical 
perspective on political normativity we endorse here; we cannot hope to defend it in this 
paper.23 The rest of the paper discusses the tools required by this practical approach to 
legitimacy, not its deeper justification.  
 
II. TWO UNDERSPEFICIED DIMENSIONS OF METACOORDINATION 
We can understand the Metacoordination View of legitimacy in terms of three ¶OHYHOV· 
1. The coordinating function a political institution performs ² for example, one might 
understand one of the state·V functions to be to coordinate the behaviour of citizens 
in order to deliver social order.  
 
22 Ibid: 180. 
23 In the justice literature, for example, and as is well known, some theorists contend that practical concerns 
are not part of the proper purview of the concept of justice. See for instance, G. A Cohen, Rescuing Justice 
and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).  
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2. The social practice of converging upon agreed legitimacy criteria to which the 
institution is to be held, which offers the social respect the institution requires to 
carry out its first-order coordinating function effectively. This social practice is the 
metacoordination process. (The ¶FRRUGLQDWLRQ· is ¶PHWD· because it is social 
coordination that adjudges institutions (il)legitimate in carrying out their own first-
order coordinating functions). 
3. Normative judgements about how the metacoordination process should be 
undertaken. This (and not the direct postulation of legitimacy criteria) is the 
SKLORVRSKHU·V primary task; the rest of this paper is devoted to contributing to this 
issue.   
 
Although the role of the philosopher in the Metacoordination View is to offer guidance on 
practices of metacoordination, it is not guidance that has in fact yet been offered by the 
theory. In the first place, we understand two dimensions of the metacoordination process 
to require additional specification. These are: the relevant constituents to a process of 
metacoordination (constituency); and how that process is to be normatively structured 
(normativity). Both of these dimensions admit of a range of possible specifications on an 
ordinal scale of demandingness: demandingness of inclusion with respect to constituency; 
and deliberative demandingness with respect to normativity. These two dimensions are 
independent of each other, in the sense that the level of demandingness on one dimension 
need not necessarily imply anything about demandingness on the other.24 We explicate 
these dimensions in the rest of this section of the paper before, in the next section, offering 
a novel, flexible way to specify the dimensions in specific circumstances, which we call 
¶FRQWH[W-GHSHQGHQFH·  
 
24 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this characterisation. 
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a. Constituency 
Who are the appropriate participants in a social process of metacoordination on standards 
of legitimacy for a given institution? In the case with which we are most familiar when we 
talk about legitimacy ² the state ² many of us will presumably answer that the relevant 
participants are, in principle, all adult persons. Note though that there are those who 
would say, were they minded to talk in the language of metacoordination, that the relevant 
constituency is not formed of individuals but rather of groups (family units, for instance), 
or that the relevant constituency is individuals, but not all individuals (a ruling class, for 
example), or that the relevant constituency is made up of only one entity (namely, God). 
To suppose that the relevant constituents to a process of metacoordination are all 
individuals, even at state level, is already to take a particular theoretical perspective.  
Even if individuals are the relevant constituents at state level, however, it does not 
automatically follow that they are the relevant agents when we come to talk about 
metacoordination over legitimacy standards for international institutions. Of course, one 
might wish to maintain that individuals remain the sole relevant constituents globally: 
someone of that persuasion would be taking a strongly cosmopolitan view. But one 
alternative is that the relevant constituents to a process of metacoordination become state 
representatives. On this view, once states have reached convergence about the standards 
of legitimacy for a given international institution, metacoordination has been realised. 
This may often be the more pragmatic view, but not an uncontroversial one: while it has 
been argued that state consent (at least when states are internally democratic) is sufficient 
for the legitimacy of international institutions25, the link between decisions made by state 
 
25 Thomas Christiano, ´ 'HPRFUDWLF Legitimacy and International ,QVWLWXWLRQVµ Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas (eds.) Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 119-137; Thomas 
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governments and the citizens who will be affected, directly or indirectly, by the operation 
of the institution in question, has been thought by some to be insufficiently democratically 
robust.26   
States and individuals are not mutually exclusive as potential metacoordination 
constituents. In theorising about justice, Rainer Forst supposes that at transnational levels, 
the ´HVVHQWLDO SOD\HUVµ in a discursive process of justification ´DUH in the first instance, 
VWDWHVµ But states are not the only players: ´DIIHFWHG parties below the state simultaneously 
have the right to demand participation in such GLVFRXUVHVµ if states would otherwise fail 
properly to represent the views of those parties. 27  Metacoordination might similarly 
involve this kind of multi-agent, multi-layered constituency. Moreover, individuals and 
states are not the only potentially relevant agents: NGOs, activist movements, and various 
other non-state groups might also be involved.28 
We can conceive of a kind of scale of demandingness of inclusion, therefore, when 
thinking about metacoordination constituency, and with respect to international 
institutions in particular. In fact, the scale will comprise a number of separate sub-scales, 
relating to the level of inclusion of different kinds of agents. Are all state governments 
constituents, or none? Are all individual persons globally constituents, or none? These are 
 
Christiano, ´,V Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International ,QVWLWXWLRQV"µ in Daniele Archibugi, 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti (eds.). Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 69-95; Thomas Christiano, ´7KH Legitimacy of 
International ,QVWLWXWLRQVµ in Andrei Marmor (ed.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. (London: 
Routledge, 2012): 380-394. For an excellent discussion of the importance of the consent of democratic states 
in international law see Samantha Besson, ´6WDWH Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making: 
Dissolving the 3DUDGR[µ Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), (29): 289-316).  
26 Allen Buchanan and Robert O Keohane, ´7KH Legitimacy of Global Governance ,QVWLWXWLRQVµ Ethics and 
International Affairs (2006) 20(4): 405²437. 
27 Rainer Forst, ´7UDQVQDWLRQDO Justice and Democracy: Overcoming Three Dogmas of Political 7KHRU\· in 
Eva Erman (ed.) Political Equality in Transnational Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 41-60, 
at 52. 
28 NGOs are, at the same time, themselves also international institutions whose own legitimacy may be at 
stake. See Viven Collingwood and Louis Logister, ´6WDWH of the Art: Addressing the INGO ¶/HJLWLPDF\ 
'HILFLW·µ Political Studies Review 3(2) (2005): 175-192.  
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the possible upper and lower ends of two inclusion sub-scales. With respect to non-state 
groups, the upper end of the sub-scale will be less clear, given the indeterminate number 
of such groups that exist (or may come to exist specifically in response to the question of 
a given institution·V legitimacy).29 
 
 
b. Normativity 
To achieve metacoordination is to reach social convergence over standards of legitimacy 
for a given institution. But how should that process of reaching convergence be 
normatively structured? For instance, must the pursuit of convergence proceed exclusively 
via the exchange of moral reasons? Or alternatively, can agents also act upon other types 
of reasons, such as their own self-interest? Must convergence be achieved only on account 
of ¶WKH unforced force of the better DUJXPHQW· 30 , or might part of the reason why 
convergence is achieved be, for instance, the strategic employment of coercion? Similarly, 
what exactly does successful metacoordination look like? Does it require consensus? Or is 
the issue rather one of a stable majority of constituents willing to understand an institution 
as legitimate if it meets certain criteria? Does convergence require explicit and positive 
 
29 The existence of these two sub-scales presents an analytical difficulty, in that it complicates pairwise 
comparisons of overall levels of inclusivity between differing metacoordination processes. Some simple cases 
are easy to settle: a metacoordination process M1 with greater inclusivity on all scales compared to a 
different metacoordination process M2, for instance, is a more inclusive one, and sits further toward the 
upper end of the master scale of demandingness of inclusion. But beyond these simple cases, there is faced 
the difficulty of determining how to compare the overall demandingness of inclusion between 
metacoordination processes M1 and M2, when metacoordination process M1 features greater inclusivity on 
one sub-scale, but lesser inclusivity on another sub-scale, than process M2. In order to preserve the notion 
that the scale of overall demandingness of inclusion is an ordinal one in which pairwise comparisons are 
always possible and their outcomes transitive, there is required a method for calculating an overall level of 
inclusion by way of amalgamation of the sub-scales. For the purposes of this paper, we can leave this issue 
aside, however, as our purpose here is not to engage in comparisons between differing metacoordination 
processes, but rather only to vindicate the idea that the demandingness of inclusion for the metacoordination 
constituency in any one case ought to be sensitive to the political context. 
30 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity, 1996): 306.  
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affirmation of those standards? Or is metacoordination achieved just assuming an 
institution is able to operate with the acquiescence of constituents, without significant 
explicit challenge?  
These questions about normative structure admit of more or less demanding 
answers, which we can characterise as more ¶OLEHUDO· and more ¶UHDOLVW· respectively.31 A 
more liberal approach can be exemplified by discourse theory. )RUVW·V work on justice, for 
instance, rests upon the fundamental moral principle of a universal ¶ULJKW to MXVWLILFDWLRQ· 
For Forst, ´ZKDW is at stake in political and social justice is norms of an institutional basic 
structure which lays claim to reciprocal and general YDOLGLW\µ. 32  A QRUP·V having 
reciprocal and general validity means that ´HDFK person should adhere to this norm as an 
agent and can demand its observance from RWKHUVµ.33 By extension, a reciprocally and 
generally valid institutional basic structure is one that no one person has good reasons not 
to adhere to in its totality, and to which one can demand adherence from others.34 The key 
to vindicating such validity is a ´ GLVFXUVLYH justification SURFHGXUHµ in which the reciprocal 
and general validity claim of given norms can themselves be assessed reciprocally (i.e. 
without any parties to the discussion ´FODLPLQJ certain privileges over others and without 
RQH·V own needs or interests being projected onto otKHUVµ and generally (i.e. ´ZLWKRXW 
excluding the objections of anyone DIIHFWHGµ).35 Convergence on standards of justice must 
be the result of a fully inclusive and explicitly undertaken exchange of exclusively moral 
reasons between equals that aims at consensus. A metacoordination process that took a 
 
31 By ¶UHDOLVW· we mean to refer in particular to the idea of ¶SROLWLFDO UHDOLVP· within contemporary political 
philosophy. For an overview see Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat, ´5HDOLVP in Normative Political 7KHRU\µ 
Philosophy Compass 9(10) (2014): 689²701. 
32 Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014): 21.  
33 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012): 19. 
34 See also: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press; 1996); Tim Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1998).  
35 Forst, The Right to Justification: 19-20.  
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similar approach would suppose that legitimacy criteria ought to be arrived at in the same 
kind of way. 
A more realist view of the normative structure of metacoordination would look 
significantly different. According to Bernard Williams·V ¶%DVLF Legitimation 'HPDQG· 
political power must offer a justification of its power to each subject.36 But although 
Williams endorsed a ¶FULWLFDO theory SULQFLSOH· ´the acceptance of a justification does not 
count if the acceptance itself is produced by the coercive power which is supposedly being 
justifLHGµ 37 ), the justificatory relationship is different to that envisaged by Forst: a 
hierarchical, largely one-directional relationship between power and subject rather than a 
horizontal, reciprocal one between equals.38  Moreover, justification need not proceed 
exclusively via the giving of moral reasons, and can instead entail appeal to, for example, 
historical context, tradition and so forth. It also explicitly does not matter whether all of 
those addressed accept the justification given.39 Consensus, even hypothetical consensus, 
is not necessary to legitimacy. In addition, we take the realist perspective to be 
theoretically content with the thought that an institution may be considered legitimate just 
in case sufficient number of people acquiesce to it: if the question of an LQVWLWXWLRQ·V 
legitimacy is not being raised in a widespread way, that is indication enough that it 
implicitly ¶PDNHV VHQVH· to those over whom that institution exercises power. In contrast 
to the liberal vision then, a realist view of the normative structure of metacoordination 
does not consist exclusively of moral reason-giving, does not necessarily require the equal 
 
36 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Princeton, NJ: 
Princton University Press, 2005): 4. 
37 In the Beginning was the Deed: 6. 
38 Some realists wish to go even further. For example, Matt Sleat claims, seemingly in rejection of the critical 
theory principle, that recognition of the legitimacy of a given institution can legitimately be generated via 
the coercive efforts of the institution in question. See 6OHDW·V Liberal Realism (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013).  
39 Edward Hall, ´%HUQDUG Williams and the Basic Legitimation Demand: A 'HIHQFHµ Political Studies 63(2) 
(2015): 466-480. 
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justificatory status of constituents, rejects the possibility of and need for consensus, and 
does not necessarily even need to be explicitly undertaken.      
Liberal approaches on the one hand and realist approaches on the other can be 
understood as two points on a scale of normative demandingness along which any number 
of intermediate theoretical approaches to normativity in metacoordination might be 
placed. Both, it should be underscored, place normative demands on legitimacy; neither is 
a simple sociological understanding. Realism, as we are understanding it here, is 
committed to the ¶critical theory principle· and to the provision of a plausible answer to 
the ¶Easic legitimation demand·. Institutions that indoctrinate their subjects in their own 
interests do not respect the former. And we take institutions that systemically violate basic 
human rights to be unable to offer a plausible answer to the latter.40 While indoctrinating, 
basic-human-rights²violating institutions may successfully obtain some form of stable 
compliance with their directives, such stable compliance would not be legitimate, because 
the concept of legitimacy involves moving beyond bare coercion and self-interest toward 
something inherently normative. We return to the idea of ¶QRUPDWLYH IORRUV· for any 
account of legitimacy in part 3.  
The deliberative normativity of metacoordination has procedural implications (and 
vice versa). If, for instance, metacoordination is to occur by way of ¶UHFLSURFDO· and 
¶JHQHUDO· moral justification, this would also imply, for Forst, a specific ¶EDVLF structure of 
justificDWLRQ· That is, a basic structure of justification in which a certain minimal standard 
of social, economic and political rights are respected that allow for the free participation 
of constituents in discursive practices. It would also imply formal democratic voting 
procedures necessary to bring a definitive conclusion to deliberation. Here, 
 
40 We are glossing over aspects of realist theory here. Not all realists endorse the critical theory principle; 
and Williams GRHVQ·W suppose that meeting the basic legitimation demand has always necessitated respect 
for basic human rights. We note these points, without believing them to be of central importance to our 
present purposes.   
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metacoordination looks almost indistinguishable from first-order democratic functioning: 
the distinction, however, would be that a process of metacoordination, itself essentially 
democratic, might potentially converge on non-democratic legitimacy criteria for the 
institution in question to adhere to thereafter. 
By contrast, where metacoordination involves more ¶UHDOLVW· normative constraints, 
the formal procedural demands will be significantly less onerous. Indeed, there may be 
required little in the way of formalised procedure at all. If we are in a situation where a 
political institution can function successfully without serious and sustained challenge to 
its authority ² where things implicitly seem to ¶PDNH VHQVH· to those subject to the 
institution ² then that might be considered procedurally sufficient. In such a case, 
metacoordination could in effect be an implicit, internal process carried out reiteratively 
by each constituent ² the lack of sustained, widespread and explicit challenge to the 
operation of the institution would be taken to imply the achievement of convergence on 
criteria of legitimacy (namely the criteria the institution is currently meeting) for that 
institution. 
 As with metacoordination constituency, what remains to be seen is how a point on 
the scale of normativity ought to be selected. Our suggestion, in the next section, is that in 
answering this question, the political context from within which a decision on legitimacy 
standards is to be made matters.  
  
III. CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE 
The previous section illustrated how the idea of a metacoordination process remains 
underspecified, and admits of differing understandings on two key dimensions. In this 
section, we develop the idea of ¶FRQWH[W-dependence· we claim that how those two 
dimensions of the metacoordination process ought to be specified depends upon aspects 
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of the ¶political decision context· from within which that metacoordination process it is to 
occur.  
 In what follows, we consider three aspects of the ¶SROLWLFDO decision FRQWH[W·. Those 
three aspects we label ¶criticality· ¶institutional time point· and ¶motivational landscape·. We 
do not say that these are the only aspects of the political decision context that may be 
relevant to metacoordination, nor do we offer any account of how an exhaustive list of 
relevant aspects of the decision context might be derived. Our aims here are more modest 
and exploratory: we want to demonstrate that political decision context matters to 
metacoordination.  
 The very broad outlines of our theory ² all to be illustrated as we proceed ² are as 
follows. For any political institution for which legitimacy criteria are to be sought at any 
one time, there will exist a related political decision context. Each of the three 
aforementioned aspects of the political decision context can affect the way we ought to 
specify one or both of the two dimensions of the metacoordination process. The same form 
of metacoordination process will therefore not be appropriate in all circumstances; it will 
instead depend on the context. The metacoordination process appropriate to any one 
political decision context then seeks convergence on a metacoordination outcome (i.e. 
criteria of legitimacy for the institution in question, along with the particular form of 
¶VRFLDO UHVSHFW· that will be offered where those criteria are met).    
There are, however, both practical and normative constraints on the extent to 
which decision context can and should affect metacoordination. The practical constraint 
is that the political context must condition metacoordination in a way that is politically 
feasible in practice (representing one aspect of the ¶HQDEOLQJ· side of legitimacy as an 
¶HQDEOLQJ FRQVWUDLQW·). Context-dependence as an idea is supposed to fit within an account 
of legitimacy as a practical concept: it therefore cannot be the case that context-
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dependence conditions the metacoordination process in a way likely to be politically 
infeasible in practice.41 There are two normative constraints ² respect for basic human 
rights42 and a ¶FULWLFDO theory SULQFLSOH· ² which are context-independent ¶QRUPDWLYH IORRUV· 
for any legitimate institution (and represent one important aspect of the ¶FRQVWUDLQLQJ· side 
of legitimacy as an ¶HQDEOLQJ FRQVWUDLQW·. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of all this.  
 The distinction between context-dependence and practice-dependence bears 
emphasising. Context-dependence is the view that the form of the metacoordination 
process ought to be sensitive to the political context from within which it is to occur. 
Practice-dependence about legitimacy is the view that legitimacy criteria for a given 
institution ought to be dependent upon the nature and function of that institution. In our 
account, practice-dependence as an idea is something for metacoordination constituents 
themselves to consider ² for any institution, legitimacy criteria may end up being 
recognisably ¶SUDFWLFH-GHSHQGHQW· but it is presumptively also possible that 
metacoordination constituents alight reiteratively on similar legitimacy criteria for 
institutions that are themselves dissimilar, or indeed different legitimacy criteria for 
institutions that are very similar, even identical, in nature. Similarly, quite what kind of 
social respect is due to institutions is also, we suggest, a matter for metacoordination 
constituents themselves to determine, not something that ought to be read from the nature 
and function of the institution in a practice-dependent manner.  
 
41 Political feasibility can be understood in terms of a probabilistic standard, with ¶VRIW FRQVWUDLQWV· such as, 
for instance, existing (potentially malleable) motivations being relevant; or it can be understood as a matter 
of simple physical or logical (im)possibility, with only these ¶KDUG FRQVWUDLQWV· being at issue (see Pablo 
Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, ´3ROLWLFDO Feasibility: A Conceptual ([SORUDWLRQµ Political Studies 60 
(2012): 809-825). In our account, the same factor ² for instance, existing public beliefs ² can be a soft 
constraint with respect to a given LQVWLWXWLRQ·V viability, while at the same time being a hard constraint with 
respect to certain forms of metacoordination about that institution. This will be highlighted as we proceed. 
42 Here, we follow Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). According to Shue basic rights articulate what he calls the ´ PRUDO PLQLPXPµ ´ >W@KH lower 
limits on tolerable conduct, individual and LQVWLWXWLRQDOµ (1996: xi). 6KXH·V understanding of the function of 
those rights seems to be particularly apt to describe what we have in mind. 
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In this we appear to diverge from Buchanan himself who, alongside the  
Metacoordination View of legitimacy, also seems to want to propose a first-order practice-
dependent view about legitimacy criteria when he says that such criteria ought to vary in 
accordance with the ´natures and functionVµ of differing institutions.43 Buchanan makes 
similar practice-dependent claims also about the kind of social respect owed to different 
legitimate institutions.44 In our view, making definitive and general first-order claims of this 
type is inconsistent with the logic of the Metacoordination View, which must leave these 
matters to metacoordination constituents themselves to determine in specific instances. 
In what follows in this section, we introduce the three aspects of the political 
decision context, offer illustrative real-world examples of how metacoordination may be 
dependent on these aspects, and defend that idea against possible worries and criticisms. 
Two such worries are that the idea of context-dependence presents a form of moral hazard, 
and that it represents a status quo bias or collapses into a purely sociological account of 
legitimacy.   
 
 
 
 
43 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, 176. 
44 See ´,QVWLWXWLRQDO /HJLWLPDF\µ in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds.) Oxford Studies in 
Political Philosophy Volume 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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a. Criticality 
The first element of the political decision context we want to highlight ² criticality ² refers 
to recognised, impending, severe circumstances. Our thought is that such circumstances 
can condition the shape of the metacoordination process appropriate for deriving 
legitimacy criteria for a given institution, specifically in a more normatively realist 
direction. However, where circumstances are either (a) not severe, (b) not near-term 
impending, or (c) not recognised as severe and impending, they cannot condition 
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normative standards for metacoordination in this way. 45 Our particular interest here is in 
an existing institution unilaterally extending its competences into a new area in order to 
respond to criticality.46 We take it to be plausible that in such circumstances, it may be 
unnecessary and indeed counterproductive to undergo a normatively ² and in particular 
procedurally ² more liberal metacoordination process in order to establish the legitimacy 
of such an extension. 
 It is likely to be counterproductive because of the time-sensitive nature of critical 
situations.47 Bluntly, in the time it might take to undergo a normatively liberal deliberative 
procedure on the legitimacy criteria demanded of an institution carrying out some new 
function, the critical situation at hand may become only more critical, making it more 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to deal with effectively. That is assuming, in addition, that 
the appropriate institutional forum already exists that would allow such metacoordination 
to occur in a timely manner, which of course is not obviously the case, for critical 
situations extending across state borders in particular. But in any case, we consider that 
any such liberal metacoordination process may be unnecessary, because the criticality of 
the situation may encourage spontaneous social respect for the institution·V actions, either 
ex-ante, when it is widely quickly accepted that the institution in question can deal with 
the critical situation, or ex-post, where this realisation occurs partly after the institution has 
indeed begun to deal with it. Either way, a liberal metacoordination procedure will not 
necessarily play any useful function, because metacoordination constituents can plausibly 
 
45  As we here understand ´ FULWLFDOLW\µ therefore, recognition of severe, impending circumstances is necessary. 
One may of course also define such circumstances themselves as critical objectively speaking, regardless of 
whether or not this is recognised by anyone. But the recognition of such circumstances as critical is important 
to the role such circumstances can play in our account of legitimacy.  
46 Where, by contrast, a critical situation is responded to by an institution working within its existing remit, 
no new question of the LQVWLWXWLRQ·V legitimacy is raised by the criticality itself. 
47 In crisis management literature this aspect of crisis has been referred to as ´WLPH FRPSUHVVLRQµ See Arjen 
Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under 
Pressure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
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independently and spontaneously reach the conclusion that the institution deserves the 
respect it requires to function. 
 As an example, consider the World Health 2UJDQLVDWLRQ·V (WHO) response to the 
2003 SARS outbreak.48 It has been claimed that the :+2·V actions in relation to this 
outbreak were ´H[FHSWLRQDOµ (in the Schmittian sense of a ¶VWDWH of H[FHSWLRQ· extending 
beyond the institution·V previously established remit.49 Specifically, the WHO   
publicly shamed states that did not comply with the recommendations and guidelines 
SUHSDUHG E\ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ « 7KLV DXWKRULWDWLYH EHKDYLRXU EURNH ZLWK :+2·V
established practice of not publicly criticizing member-VWDWHV « 6HFRQG :+2 LVVXHG
explicit travel warnings, beginning in April 2003, for the most affected territories in China, 
Hong Kong and Canada, even though it had never received a mandate to take such 
measures.50  
As Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen clarify, since ´6$56 was successfully 
contained by May 2003 and the number of casualties remained below 1000, the crisis was 
seen as a success story for :+2µ.51  
 Our suggestion is that the mutually recognised critical nature of the SARS outbreak 
enjoined and enabled a normatively more ¶UHDOLVW· and specifically, procedurally less 
substantive, metacoordination process. Despite the unilateral nature of the extension of 
WHO competences, it seems to have ultimately been implicitly accepted by states ² 
without the need for prior explicit deliberation ² that given the circumstances, WHO 
 
48 Here, our specific focus will be on specific actions of the WHO rather than the legitimacy of the WHO tout 
court.  
49 Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ´:+2 Decides on the Exception? Securitization and 
Emergency Governance in Global +HDOWKµ Security Dialogue 45(4) (2014):331-348; for consideration of 
exceptional measures with reference instead to the 2009 swine flu outbreak, see Maria Agius, ´'\LQJ a 
Thousand Deaths: Recurring Emergencies and Exceptional Measures in International /DZµ Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 2(1) (2010): 219-242. 
50 Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, ´:+2 Decides on the ([FHSWLRQ"µ 337. 
51 Ibid: 337. 
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pronouncements and epidemiological criteria should be understood as authoritative.52 
This interpretation is given succour by the fact that states subsequently agreed to legally 
formalise the :+2·V emergency powers, in line with what had occurred, in the revised 
International Health Regulations in 2005. 
 One might, however, want to claim that it was only at this later stage, where explicit 
state consent to the extension of WHO emergency powers was gathered, that the 
legitimacy of the extension of those powers was in fact properly established. On this view, 
circumstances of criticality do not condition the metacoordination process from which 
legitimacy judgements are to be derived, but only defer that judgement until after the 
critical situation has passed. It might be thought that this way of looking at things is more 
sensible, because it allows for a scenario in which, for example, it retrospectively comes to 
light that an institution, while effectively responding to a critical situation, did so in a 
manner unreasonably discriminatory against a certain group. Indeed, it allows for a 
scenario in which that discriminatory activity was common knowledge at the time, and 
yet the majority of the population nevertheless offered the institution the social respect 
necessary for it to function in that way, which we in hindsight would want to consider 
unjustifiable.  
This is an important response, which enjoins a qualification of our view. We do 
not say that in critical circumstances the metacoordination process will necessarily, or even 
frequently, finally look normatively less liberal and more realist. Where claims of the type 
mentioned above are levied, then there is reason to engage, retrospectively, in a 
procedurally more liberal metacoordination process that may well have the effect of 
revising and overturning any earlier sense that the institution acted legitimately. This does 
 
52 We are here simply assuming that states are the appropriate constituents, in order to concentrate on 
drawing a link between criticality and metacoordination normativity.   
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not mean, however, that this type of retrospective process must occur. Suppose, by 
contrast, that there are no claims raised of discriminatory activity, and no evidence that 
any occurred. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to instigate any retrospective liberal 
and procedurally substantive metacoordination process: the fact that the emergency agent 
performed a critical function which delivered spontaneous social respect is process enough 
to establish the legitimacy of the action. To return to our example, although the extension 
of WHO emergency powers was only formalised in the subsequently revised 2005 
International Health Regulations, this was not a necessary element of establishing the 
legitimacy of the :+2·V earlier extension of competence: if no such ex-post formalisation 
had occurred, it is still possible to understand that extension as legitimate on the basis of 
a minimalist, implicit metacoordination process enjoined by the critical circumstances that 
pertained. The subsequent formalisation of the extension merely plays the role, we suggest, 
of making that earlier minimalist metacoordination plain.53  
Another type of response to our view might be forthcoming, however, from an 
opposing direction. A political realist might ask whether criticality is in fact doing much 
work here. After all, if an institution can operate successfully without widespread and 
explicit challenge, and with general acquiescence, then why is that not sufficient to 
understand the institution as receiving the relevant kind of social respect, and thus as 
legitimate, regardless of whether the institution is dealing with a critical situation? Our 
answer is the link between criticality and the plausibility of presuming widespread 
recognition or consensus, among constituents, of institutional purpose and desirability. In 
the WHO case, there was, we presume, a widely shared recognition of the critical nature 
 
53 When considering the ex-post legalisation of emergency powers, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain 
suggest that this can occur only where such powers are retrospectively formally ratified. Our view differs, 
not only in being about legitimacy rather than legality, but also in denying that formal ratification is always 
necessary. See Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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of the SARS outbreak, a widely shared interest in its efficient control, and widely shared 
recognition that the actions of the WHO were intended to serve this shared aim. As a 
result, we consider it reasonable to interpret adherence to the pronouncements of that 
institution as spontaneous or implicit metacoordination about the desirability of having 
that institution perform that function. The fact that we emphasise presumed (near-
)consensus indicates that, in this political context, we envisage a metacoordination process 
more normatively realist in some respects (in particular in its procedure) and more liberal 
in others (the place of consensus).  
 But now consider, by contrast, a scenario lacking criticality. Where an institution 
begins to perform some function not recognised as critical ² imagine, for example, that the 
WHO issued travel warnings and ¶SXEOLF shamings· not in response to a SARS outbreak, 
but in response to low food hygiene standards ² which was nevertheless met with broad 
adherence, we do not suppose that that acquiescence can as reasonably be interpreted as 
akin to spontaneous or implicit metacoordination. Instead, that adherence may more 
plausibly house attitudes and beliefs ranging from suppressed hostility, to disinterest, to 
positive support. In these circumstances, a normatively liberal ² and in particular, 
procedurally substantive ² metacoordination process is enjoined to attempt to establish 
conclusively whether there in fact exists a desire for there to be an institution performing 
this kind of function. Since the situation is not critical, the time pressures that advise a 
more minimalist metacoordination process do not apply.  
 By this point readers may be getting frustrated. They will point out that in practice, 
whether or not we are in circumstances are severe and impending is frequently politically 
contested; and even if there is an objective fact of the matter, that fact may nevertheless be 
rejected by many. In addition, there is a worry that appeal to such circumstances can serve 
as a pretext for the extension of political power sought for its own reasons, and that such 
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extension may be given the veneer of legitimacy just in case the relevant populace is 
sufficiently alarmed to acquiesce with it. There can, in other words, be both ¶IDOVH 
nHJDWLYHV· and ¶IDOVH SRVLWLYHV· with respect to criticality.  
These worries further condition the import of criticality, in two respects. The first, 
with respect to false negatives, is a matter of political feasibility: even if it is the case that 
a given circumstance is severe and impending objectively speaking, where this is 
nevertheless a matter of explicit political dispute, then it simply cannot be the case that a 
metacoordination process and outcome can occur implicitly and spontaneously, because 
it is a condition of the ODWWHU·V possibility that this reality is indeed widely recognised. 
Contrast the example of SARS with that of climate change. Although there is a scientific 
fact of the matter about climate change, it is also the case that the facts are politically 
disputed (not just in terms of whether we should concentrate on the reduction of carbon 
emissions or the production of adaptive technology, but whether we should do much about 
it at all, or even whether man-made climate change is happening). Given this, criticality 
cannot currently condition the metacoordination process for climate change institutions in 
the way we have suggested occurred with respect to the WHO: acquiescence with the 
extension of power in the latter case was premised upon widespread recognition of severe 
impending circumstances; but the severity of the circumstances remains (politically, if not 
scientifically) disputed in the climate change case, meaning that there cannot (yet) possibly 
be an equivalent process of implicit, spontaneous metacoordination about climate change 
institutions. If a metacoordination outcome is to be realised, it will instead need to be via 
an explicit process which first addresses the very question of the consequences of climate 
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change. This is a first indication of the way in which context-dependence is itself 
conditioned by political feasibility, per Figure 1.54 
The second worry above, however ² the false positive worry ² was that the prospect 
of ´severe and impending circumstancesµ might be cynically used as a pretext for the 
extension of political power, with apparently spontaneous recognition of those 
circumstances and acceptance of the extension of power in fact deliberately engendered 
by the same power that stands to benefit from that extension. In the language of 
securitisation theory, there is a worry that political institutions, as powerful ¶VHFXULWLVLQJ 
DFWRUV· may seek to socially construct certain issues as critical security threats precisely in 
order to extend their own powers.55 Our response here is to appeal to what can be thought 
of as a variation on :LOOLDPV·V ¶FULWLFDO theory SULQFLSOH· acquiescence to an extension of 
powers in the face of apparent severe and impending circumstances does not help 
legitimise the extension if that sense of criticality has been deliberately socially constructed 
by the institution whose powers are being extended, merely in order to enable that very 
extension. In such cases, we should remain unwilling to accept that an appropriate 
metacoordination process has occurred. 
 This of course leaves unaddressed the vexed question of how actually to determine 
when such a critical theory principle has been flouted. 56  Settling such a question in 
inevitably beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, we need only need it to be possible 
that there can exist certain political circumstances in which the principle is not flouted, and 
 
54 It is politically infeasible that a new international institution could unilaterally and successfully invest itself 
with the power to deal with the emergency of climate change ² infeasible in a ¶VRIW· sense, because it is only 
very unlikely that it could do so (given the constraint of the lack of widespread recognition of criticality), not 
literally impossible. But when it comes to the metacoordination, that lack of widespread recognition of 
criticality is a ¶KDUG· feasibility constraint, since without such agreement, there cannot be any 
metacoordination process and outcome premised upon it, as a matter of basic logic.   
55 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1997).  
56 Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge: Polity, 
1996); Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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in which criticality can therefore be relevant to metacoordination.  The WHO example we 
give here is, we suggest, a good candidate for such a possibility. There are at least four 
reasons, we believe, for thinking so. First, while the spread of infectious disease is of course 
¶IUDPHDEOH· in different ways, there is at least some level of scientific objectivity 
underpinning such a phenomenon that might lead us to suppose that the threat is not 
merely a construction of political power. Secondly and relatedly, the WHO as an 
organisation, while it will of course have its own institutional imperatives, is in essence 
primarily a technical institution. While contests over political power (which may motivate 
the construction of threat in order to shore up such power) are inherent in institutions like 
the state, such is less obviously the case in organisations like the WHO. Third, the power 
relationship between WHO and states is significantly different to that between a state and 
its citizens. The state pervades the day-to-day experience of its citizens, and holds power 
over those citizens, in ways which render the self-serving engendering of belief possible. 
The same is not obviously true of the WHO with respect to states. Fourth, states, unlike 
individual citizens, in most cases possess considerable epistemic resources (scientific 
experts, for instance) which, in the case at hand here, provide some assurance that the 
circumstances at hand were indeed genuinely critical.   
 
b. Institutional Time Point 
By ¶LQVWLWXWLRQDO time SRLQW· we mean to refer to whether a given institution already exists 
or is merely proposed to come into existence. Our view is that this can matter to the 
demands of metacoordination, and thus to legitimacy. Specifically, we suggest that, in at 
least some cases, the transition from pre- to post-institutional existence ought to bring a 
corresponding transition from a form of metacoordination process that prioritises robust 
procedure to one that pays greater attention to consequences of the metacoordination 
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process. 57  Metacoordination ¶QRUPDWLYLW\· and ¶FRQVWLWXHQF\· flex according to these 
changing prioritisations. Prior to institutional existence, there is in certain cases the 
potential for the metacoordination process to fail (that is, to fail to converge upon a 
metacoordination outcome) without adverse consequences. In such cases, liberal 
procedural norms should play a prominent role in determining the metacoordination 
process. However, post institutional existence, the opportunity for metacoordination to 
fail without consequence will often disappear; from within a practical approach to 
legitimacy, it then becomes important to pay attention to those consequences.  
When thinking about legitimacy, many philosophers, particularly those working in 
a ¶social contract· tradition, are wont to begin by imagining a point zero ² a hypothetical 
foundational moment that can inform us about the proper requirements of legitimacy with 
respect to institutions, usually states, that in fact already exist. Typical here is the notion 
that at this hypothetical point zero, the institution could and should be endorsed, following 
some appropriately normatively structured procedure, by all of those over whom it will 
thereafter hold authority. In the language of metacoordination dimensions: the relevant 
constituency is understood to be all state citizens; and there are typically robustly ¶OLEHUDO· 
(if variable) normative demands placed upon the contracting parties with respect to the 
procedure that delivers the contract ² for instance, an emphasis of consensus.  
The closest real-world surrogates here are, we suggest, constitutional conventions: 
these formal procedures aim at extensive inclusion, and at wide-ranging deliberation with 
as much eventual consensus as possible. We understand such aspiration to be appropriate 
 
57 To suggest one should pay more attention to consequences is by no means a way to commit to some form 
of consequentialism. Following Rawls, we can say that ´DOO ethical doctrines worth our attention take 
consequences into account in judging rightness. One that did not would simply be irrational, FUD]\µ John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971): 30. This applies to how we 
conceive of context-dependence. Changes in institutional time point, we suggest, can alter the magnitude of 
the consequences of potential failure of the metacoordination process.  
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to the constitutional political context; if constituents are to be brought under a new 
political authority, they ought when possible to be given the opportunity to deliberate 
about what such an authority is to be for, and in which circumstances, if any, they consent 
to the creation of an institution performing that function. 58  Notably, a constitutional 
convention can fail: if it turns out not to be possible to generate sufficient consensus about 
(i) what an institution should be for and (ii) what legitimacy criteria it should be held to in 
the conducting of that function, then the institution may not be created at all.  
 Of course, if such a convention fails for an institution that already exists, there is 
no option not to create it. There obviously remains the option to dismantle the institution 
if, after the fact, a procedure of the ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO· form cannot derive settled legitimacy 
criteria. However, neglecting to create an institution on the one hand, and dismantling it 
after it already exists on the other, are not equivalents. This is because dismantling an 
institution that already exists may have significantly worse consequences than not setting 
up the institution in the first place.  
In circumstances in which there is reason to expect that dismantling the institution 
would bring severe consequences which it is important to avoid, and yet there is seemingly 
no prospect of a ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO· variety of metacoordination yielding sufficient consensus 
about the function of an institution and the standards of legitimacy to which it should be 
held, a dilemma is faced: either one concludes that the institution must be illegitimate; or 
else one tempers RQH·V understanding of what metacoordination can look like in such 
circumstances. We suggest that where legitimacy is understood as practical concept, there 
is reason to favour the second approach. In the political circumstances at hand, 
maintaining that an institution must successfully undergo a constitutional-style 
metacoordination procedure or else be considered illegitimate runs the risk of undermining 
 
58 We here assume critical circumstances are not at hand.  
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the LQVWLWXWLRQ·V ability to continue playing the coordinative function that at this point is 
presumptively important to avoid bad consequences. If the SKLORVRSKHU·s role is to 
contribute to setting out morally defensible social practices of metacoordination, we argue 
that it can occasionally be defensible for a metacoordination procedure less concerned 
with consensus, with full inclusion, or with ¶PRUDOLVW· normativity than the constitutional 
picture to be enjoined, on account of the desire to avoid the negative consequences that 
now loom.   
We can take as an example the Economic and Monetary Union of the European 
Union (EMU). It is plausible to suggest that EMU came about without any shared 
understanding, among the founding member states, of what its purpose was.59 Rather, they 
had various differing motivations, often self-interested. Further to this, the relevant 
European treaty (Maastricht) was ratified in various states (Greece, Ireland and Italy, for 
example) by way of simple parliamentary majority ² there was, in those instances, no 
requirement of supermajorities that would have gone some way to mimicking the pursuit 
of consensus. Moreover, we can say that the constituency of the process was less inclusive 
than one might hope: there were only a few referendums (one of which failed).  
This is all to say that there did not occur, prior to the institution of EMU, 
metacoordination of the ideal ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO· type, with high demandingness of inclusion 
and normativity. Had such a model of metacoordination occurred, it might have been the 
case that EMU was designed differently ² providing,  for instance, for mechanisms 
mandating fiscal transfers necessary to deal with possible external shocks to the Eurozone 
area that would affect countries unequally.60 But more to the point, it might have been 
concluded that since there was no consensus about the appropriate shape or bare 
 
59 Markus K. Brunnermeir, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press).  
60 Per ¶RSWLPDO currency DUHD· theory. For the original statement of the theory, see Robert A. Mundell, ´$ 
Theory of Optimum Currency $UHDVµ The American Economic Review 51(4) (1961): 657-665. 
33 
 
desirability of these mechanisms, or indeed the point of EMU at all, there had not been 
achieved a form of metacoordination outcome appropriate to the political context at hand 
² the constitutional moment ² and that therefore EMU should not go ahead. To be clear, 
this is not to say that there was nothing that could be called a metacoordination outcome 
that occurred in advance of EMU ² the very fact that EMU could occur indicates that there 
existed some sufficiently powerful constituency willing to provide the idea of EMU with 
the social respect that enabled it to come into being. Our claim, rather, is that it was the 
wrong kind of metacoordination process (and hence metacoordination outcome) for the 
political context ² with too limited a constituency, and too lax a normative structure. Were 
the appropriate form of metacoordination process to have been employed at that time, it 
is possible that a metacoordination outcome would not have been achieved, and EMU 
would not have gone ahead.  
In the event, of course, EMU did go ahead. The Great Recession of 2008 has put 
EMU under considerable strain, leading as it did to increased economic divergence 
between Eurozone countries. In lieu of any mechanism for direct fiscal transfers, 
increasing deficits have been addressed (most notably in Greece) via ¶financial DVVLVWDQFH· 
in the form of loans by the IMF and other members of the Euro area. Receipt of this 
assistance was made conditional on increased ¶competitiveness· to be achieved through 
structural reforms, including labour market reforms, cuts to the welfare state (e.g. pension 
entitlements) and public sector wages. The reforms imposed extremely high human costs 
on recipients and severely restricted their political autonomy.61 European citizens, and in 
particular citizens of so-called ¶SHULSKHUDO FRXQWULHV· have every reason to be angry about 
how things stand; they have a good claim to having been treated unjustly.  
 
61 Joseph Stiglitz, The Euro and its Threat to the Future of Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2016). 
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Nevertheless, and this is our central point here, it does not follow that the form of 
metacoordination process that should have occurred before EMU was institutionalised is 
the same kind of metacoordination process that should be undertaken now, and that 
(assuming that the related metacoordination outcome could not in fact now be successfully 
realised) we should therefore consider EMU illegitimate. What must be taken account of 
now, but not before, is that a failed metacoordination of the constitutional type, and 
resultant judgement of illegitimacy, may lead to the instability and even disintegration of 
EMU, bringing potentially disastrous consequences in train.  
Denying the legitimacy of the EMU impairs its ability to function effectively. 
Absent the social respect afforded to institutions understood as legitimate, VXEMHFWV· 
compliance with those institutions is contingent upon reasons such as congruence with 
personal interest, widespread coercion, or normative judgments about the content of 
specific directives issued by the institution. Relying only on such reasons and mechanisms 
imposes a clear risk of instability: normative judgments about specific institutional 
directives may not be widely shared, widespread coercion is costly and not a long term 
solution, and congruence between what the institution does and what is in particular 
subjHFWV· interests will vary over time and among subjects. This is a particularly poignant 
concern for a currency union ² unless the currency area is economically homogeneous, 
divergence of economic interests and disagreement about the normative underpinnings of 
redistributive policies will feature. Without the social respect afforded by legitimacy 
judgements, the EMU is exposed to a substantial risk of collapse.62   
 
62 Kevin Aslett, and James Caporaso, ´%UHDNLQJ Up is Hard to Do: Why the Eurozone Will 6XUYLYHµ 
Economies 4(4) (2016), 21. 
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The implications of any such collapse could potentially be tragic.63 Assuming the 
reintroduction of individual currencies in any peripheral country would require an interim 
period of roughly one year, there could follow huge capital flight, aggressive forms of 
speculation in the sovereign bond market, the ballooning of the value of public debt still 
denominated in Euros,64 and the likely default on such debts. 6WDWHV· banking systems 
would also be under threat: knowing that the value of RQH·V savings would devalue, savers 
could decide to withdraw their money from their bank accounts over the course of the 
interim period.65  
So: an inclusive, liberal metacoordination process will in all likelihood not succeed 
in legitimising EMU today; and yet a widespread sense that this is the form the 
metacoordination process must take, with resultant judgement of illegitimacy, risks great 
damage. But these are not the only options. From the perspective of a practical 
understanding of legitimacy, there is reason to endorse a different way to think about 
metacoordination in the current political decision context. While a restricted 
metacoordination constituency can be understood as inappropriate prior to the institution 
of EMU, it is more plausibly appropriate now: we can think that the Maastricht Treaty 
should originally have been ratified everywhere via referendum, while thinking 
 
63 Yanis Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer What they Must? Europe, Austerity and the Threat to Global Stability 
(London: Vintage, 2016). 
64 Assuming that not all debt contracts can be re-denominated in the local currency. 
65 Barry Eichengreen sums up this kind of scenario: ´Advance planning will be required for the process to 
go smoothly, as was the case with the introduction of the physical euro in 2002. Moreover, abandoning the 
euro will presumably entail lengthy political debate and the passage of a bill by a national parliament or 
legislature, also over an extended period of time. Meanwhile, there will be an incentive for agents who are 
anticipating the redenomination of their claims into the national currency, followed by depreciation of the 
latter, to rush out of domestic banks and financial assets, precipitating a banking and financial collapse. 
Limiting the negative repercussions would be a major technical and policy challenge for a government 
contemplating abandonment of the HXURµ  See Barry Eichengreen, ´7KH Break Up of the Euro $UHDµ in 
Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi (eds.) Europe and the Euro (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2008): 11-52. Governments can counteract some of the difficulties. They can impose strong forms of 
capital controls, they can try to re-write debt contracts in the local currency, they can prevent savers from 
withdrawing funds from financial institutions. However, first, these remedies, in a democracy, are likely to 
be firmly resisted, and second, they can only partially address the underlying concerns (governments cannot 
control, for example, the reactions of foreign investors).      
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referendums on continuing membership of the Eurozone are now inappropriate, on 
account of the risk they pose now to VWDWHV· economic wellbeing, a risk not posed originally. 
Similarly, while we can say that, prior to its institution, EMU ought to have been 
contingent upon a shared understanding of its purpose, and metacoordination ought to 
have proceeded via the exchange of reasons why, inter alia,  differing institutionalisations 
of EMU do or GRQ·W best secure that purpose, to suppose that such a shared understanding 
of purpose and way of proceeding are now a necessary requirement of a defensible 
metacoordination process is to ignore the fact that there are now consequences that follow 
from a judgement of  illegitimacy that did not follow before.  
Moreover, while it would presumably not be the case that, prior to the existence of 
EMU, a defensible metacoordination on legitimacy criteria would involve foreseeable 
unjust treatment, it might nevertheless, post-creation, be the case that the changed political 
context means that EMU is judged unjust in some of its effects and yet still legitimate. 
This conclusion is consistent with the practical understanding of legitimacy that 
understands it as a less demanding concept than justice. In sum: while a metacoordination 
process on the model of a constitutional convention would have been appropriate prior to 
the institution of EMU, a more realist vision of the metacoordination process, in which a 
metacoordination outcome is understood to have been realised just in case there is 
sufficient tacit consent or acquiescence with the institution for it to continue, can be 
thought acceptable given the changed context.  
There are caveats to be entered. The first is to again highlight the importance of 
political feasibility to context-dependence. Given the practical understanding of 
legitimacy, it cannot be the case that institutional time point conditions metacoordination 
in a way that would in practice be politically infeasible. So, with respect to EMU, it would 
be no good suggesting that a post-hoc metacoordination process ought to be modelled in 
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the way we have suggested, based on some combination of tactic consent and 
acquiescence, if, as a matter of fact, reserves of tacit consent and acquiescence were not 
sufficient to uphold the institution.66 If dissatisfaction with the institutions of the European 
Union continues to grow, there will come a point at which EMU will cease to benefit from 
even this minimalist understanding of social respect. At that stage, EMU would not be 
benefiting from any kind of metacoordination outcome and would be liable to collapse.  
A second worry is that we here introduce a form of moral hazard: powerful political 
actors have incentive to avoid tricky constitutional procedures when first setting up new 
institutions, since they can seemingly then help themselves to weaker legitimacy criteria 
by making the prospect of the subsequent dismantling of the institution too costly.67 Part 
of our answer here must be simply to recognise the hazard which is, to some extent, 
inherent in the practical approach to legitimacy as an ¶HQDEOLQJ FRQVWUDLQW· that we take in 
this paper. In our view, however, the hazard is not such that it outweighs the benefits of 
taking such an approach to thinking about legitimacy, just as the moral hazard involved 
in (some) insurance schemes does not, per se, outweigh the benefits of having such 
schemes. Among those benefits is that context-dependence has something to say in 
(frequent) scenarios in which what should have been done in the past was not done, 
changing the circumstances that now pertain. We consider this an advantage over 
inflexible approaches to institutional legitimacy.  
A third closely related worry responds to a status quo bias worry. Is it even possible 
to criticise existing institutions, given the form of argument ZH·YH laid out here? There are 
two things to say. The first is to refer to the two normative floors that are a feature of the 
 
66 As with criticality, there are both ¶VRIW· and ¶KDUG· feasibility constraints in view here. The continuation of 
EMU is unlikely to be able to continue functioning without the continued general acquiesce of the Eurozone 
population: that acquiescence is a ¶VRIW FRQVWUDLQW· with respect to the functioning of the institution. But that 
same acquiescence is a ¶KDUG· constraint with respect to the feasibility of the more realist metacoordination 
process: if that acquiescence is not there, then obviously such metacoordination cannot occur.  
67 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this challenge.  
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context-dependence model: if the reason a given population is acquiescing with the 
demands of an institution is because that acquiescence has been deliberately inculcated in 
a population precisely so they will acquiesce ² flouting the ¶FULWLFDO theory SULQFLSOH· ² then 
there remains a basis for critique, and for declining to suppose that a metacoordination 
outcome has in fact been achieved at all; the same is the case where an institution is 
systematically infringing basic human rights. A second response is to underscore the 
difference between legitimacy and justice. An institution is legitimate when it receives 
some level of social respect that enables it to function; this is not the same as its being 
considered just. In most democracies citizens embark on forms of political protest against 
perceived injustice on a regular basis: most of them do not intend to question the bare 
legitimacy of the state against which they are agitating.  
Of course, if an institution consistently and doggedly fails to reform in the direction 
of what is perceived to be just, the effect may be to undermine the social respect offered to 
that institution, and hence its legitimacy. Here we see another kind of way in which time 
matters: institutions that prove incapable of reforming themselves over time may 
eventually imperil even a more realist metacoordination outcome, by encouraging more 
explicit resistance. The European institutions may turn out to be a case in point.  
 
c. Motivational landscape 
By ¶PRWLYDWLRQDO ODQGVFDSH· we mean to refer to the levels of interest that a population 
displays in a given institution, and in particular, the motivation to be involved in political 
deliberation about the legitimacy of that institution. Our claim here is that (a) the 
metacoordination constituency must necessarily be coextensive with the motivational 
landscape that pertains in a given political context, and that (b) this inevitably involves 
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inserting a degree of inequality into the metacoordination process, which has implications 
for its normativity dimension.  
People are, in general, often uninterested in politics. The extent of public interest - 
the ¶motivational landscape· - changes, however, according to the institution at hand. If 
much of the public is politically unengaged in any one state context, this is only truer of 
transnational institutions like the EU. And when it comes to more obscure international 
institutions, the relevant public may not only be largely uninterested and correspondingly 
not very motivated at all to have a say about the criteria according to which that institution 
should be considered legitimate, but indeed may not even know that the institution exists. 
For an example of the last type, take the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
function of which is ´WR serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial 
stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central 
EDQNVµ. The BIS does this partly via the ¶Basel Process·, which refers to the role of the BIS 
´LQ hosting and supporting the work of the international secretariats engaged in standard 
setting and the pursuit of financial VWDELOLW\µ There are nine such secretariats, as well as 
three groups with ´VHSDUDWH legal SHUVRQDOLW\µ that BIS also hosts as part of the Basel 
Process.68 It will not be controversial to suggest that the workings of the BIS do not exercise 
the mind of most people, if they have heard of it at all.69 Because of this reality, it becomes 
a practical necessity ² a matter of political feasibility70 ² for the relevant metacoordination 
constituency to be far less inclusive than, for instance, all individuals worldwide. Instead, 
the metacoordination constituency will comprise, for example, some combination of state 
 
68 https://www.bis.org/about/ Accessed 27th April 2017.  
69 Even state-level regulators are often not fully equipped to follow these legal complexities and must rely on 
private industry experts to some degree. The latter phenomenon is a well-documented feature of both trade 
negotiations and agreements on banking regulation establishing international equivalents of capital 
requirements for global banks. See Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World 
Trading System: WTO and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
70 A soft feasibility constraint, since motivations can change over time.  
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governments, industry experts, NGOs, and engaged international activists. The 
motivational landscape has clear and direct implications for metacoordination 
constituency, then: the latter will by necessity be limited by the former.  
The implications of the motivational landscape for metacoordination normativity 
are more nuanced. To show this, we can distinguish between the practical 
metacoordination constituency, and the institutional constituency. The practical 
constituency is the actual metacoordination constituency which by necessity flexes in line 
with the motivational landscape. The institutional constituency is the fully inclusive 
population picked out by an ¶DOO affected LQWHUHVWV· principle· 71 , or an ¶DOO VXEMHFWHG· 
principle 72 , or similar, with respect to the institution in question.73  It is the practical 
FRQVWLWXHQF\·V offering or withholding of social respect which matters to the viability of 
institutional functioning, since by definition the remainder of the institutional 
constituency is motivated to do neither. The practical constituency inevitably then enjoys 
a kind of normative priority: it is the members of the practical constituency that count in 
determining legitimacy criteria. This is not because other views are actively discounted, 
but is rather by default, because the remainder of the institutional constituency does not 
offer any views at all.  
This, inevitably, entails that the practical constituency will possess significant 
discretion to settle for itself inherently debateable matters that will arise during the 
metacoordination process ² such as, for example, the relative importance of %XFKDQDQ·V 
¶FRXQWLQJ UHDVRQV· whether and how legitimacy criteria ought to be practice-dependent,  
 
71 Robert E. Goodin, ´ (QIUDQFKLVLQJ All Affected Interests, and its Alternativesµ Philosophy and Public Affairs 
35(1) (2007): 40-68; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ´+RZ to Diagnose Democratic Deficits in Global Politics: 
The Use of the ¶$OO-Affected 3ULQFLSOH·µ International Theory (online early: DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971916000312).  
72 Nancy Fraser, ´:KR counts? Dilemmas of Justice in a Postwetphalian :RUOGµ Antipode 41(1) (2010): 
281-297; Robert E. Goodin, ´(QIUDQFKLVLQJ All Subjected, :RUOGZLGHµ International Theory 8(3) (2016): 
365-389.  
73 We can make no intervention into that debate here. 
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and the kind of social respect that ought to be offered to the institution ² that the wider 
institutional constituency might have taken a different view on, were it to have been 
motivated to engage. In that sense, the practical constituency is granted a kind of epistemic 
guardianship: it is given the role of determining what the legitimacy criteria are for a given 
institution on behalf of the wider institutional constituency.  
 In this regard, an interesting feature of the BIS case, in particular, is that the 
population motivated to deliberate about its legitimacy appears likely also to be the 
population that has significant epistemic competence with respect to the %,6·V affairs. 
Because the BIS does not have an obvious direct impact upon SHRSOH·V lives, and its 
existence does not typically pervade public spheres, interest in its functioning and 
legitimacy cannot be stimulated merely by continued recognised exposure to it. Thus, 
those who come to be interested in the question of the %,6·V legitimacy are instead likely 
to be those who first come to learn about how it operates, either for professional reasons 
or due to atypical levels of political engagement generally. Given this confluence of 
motivation and epistemic competence, the prevalent motivational landscape with respect 
to the BIS allows the metacoordination constituency potentially to mimic the benefits that 
those who defend the democratic nature of ¶QRQ-majoritarian LQVWLWXWLRQV· emphasise, such 
as, in particular, a high knowledge base and higher standard of deliberation.74  
The motivational landscape in this instance, then, inevitably offers the practical 
constituency a privileged status in the metacoordination process; it receives the ¶QRUPDWLYH 
SRZHU· to settle upon legitimacy criteria for an institution, a power that the wider 
institutional constituency does not receive (or rather, does not take up). In that respect, 
 
74 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Madeco and Andrew Moravcsik, ´ 'HPRFUDF\-Enhancing 
0XOWLODWHUDOLVPµ International Organization 63(1) (2009): 1-31: 8. The argument we are making here however 
is distinct from an arugment for the legitimacy of international institutions as non-majoritarian institutions. 
To offer an account of the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions is to make a first-order claim about 
institutional legitimacy; we are by contrast making a second-order claim about how legitimacy criteria ought 
to be derived.  
42 
 
paying attention to the motivational landscape entails accepting a kind of inequality in the 
process of metacoordination, an inequality which to that extent moves us further toward 
the ¶UHDOLVW· end of the scale of normative demandingness.  
However, this is definitively not to say that the practical constituency is thereby 
licensed to ignore the interests of the wider institutional constituency in its pursuit of 
convergence on standards of legitimacy. While the practical constituency must indeed 
possess the scope to settle certain contestable questions concerning legitimacy criteria, it 
cannot do so in ways that violate the basic human rights ² typically understood to be 
politically incontestable rights ² of the wider institutional constituency. In other words, the 
practical constituency cannot select legitimacy criteria that would impose excessive moral 
costs on the wider institutional constituency. Here again we see the constraining influence 
of one of the context-independent ¶QRUPDWLYH IORRUV· that are a feature of the context-
dependence model.  
The second normative floor ² respect for a kind of critical theory principle ² further 
conditions the practical FRQVWLWXHQF\·V room for manoeuvre. The lack of interest of a wider 
institutional constituency, it might be suggested, is not some natural fact, but might be 
deliberately encouraged and maintained, potentially by those who seek to benefit from the 
lack of political participation that follows. Issues of economic governance, in particular ² 
the soundness of, say, ¶inflation targeting as a policy framework·, or ¶the best tools to be 
used to operate counter-cyclical monetary expansions when interest rates are near the zero 
lower bound· ² may be deliberately framed as technocratic questions (and expressed in 
technocratic language!) in order to ¶GHSROLWLFLVH· them. If, however, state governments (for 
example) are deliberately and consistently maintaining their FLWL]HQV· ignorance about a 
given international institution in order to exclude them as practical metacoordination 
constituents, then that in itself would be a reason to reject the idea that the deliberations 
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of any such practical constituency could lead to legitimate metacoordination outcomes. 
As it happens, we do not consider that the primary reason for widespread ignorance of the 
BIS is that such ignorance is deliberately maintained. More likely explanations seem to be 
the aforementioned lack of pervasiveness within SHUVRQV· lives and, where persons are 
aware of the LQVWLWXWLRQ·V existence but nevertheless remain unmotivated to learn and 
deliberate about it, a kind of ¶UDWLRQDO LJQRUDQFH·75   
 This still leaves the possibility that a lack of interest is not deliberately engendered 
in the wider institutional constituency, the basic human rights of the latter are not 
infringed, and yet the practical constituency nevertheless skews the metacoordination 
outcome to its own particular benefit in some way. Here the response is twofold. First, it 
has to be admitted that this is indeed a possibility ² even a probability ² from within the 
practical approach to legitimacy that context-dependence evidences. To insist that any 
metacoordination process that is in any way skewed toward the benefit of the practical 
constituency cannot derive valid legitimacy criteria is to overlook the point that the 
concept of legitimacy is supposed in part to be an enabling one; requiring the process by 
which legitimacy criteria are derived to be shorn of all vestiges of self-interest is to take too 
stringent a line, which ignores this enabling function. Second, we can point out that the 
practical constituency is not a closed club: its current members cannot determine its future 
ones. And, bar cases in which the critical theory principle is violated, making choices that 
persistently favour the practical constituency at the expense of the wider institutional 
constituency is a good recipe, at least in the long run, for altering the motivational 
landscape and stimulating the attention of those who are systematically penalised, thereby 
 
75 Andrew Moravcsik, ´,V there a ¶'HPRcratic 'HILFLW· in World Politics? A Framework for $QDO\VLVµ 
Government and Opposition 39(2) (2004): 336-363.  
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bringing them into the practical constituency, and reopening the question of the 
LQVWLWXWLRQ·V legitimacy.   
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper endorses a practical way of thinking about legitimacy that we understand to be 
underlying Allen %XFKDQDQ·V ¶0HWDFRRUGLQDWLRQ 9LHZ· of that concept. In our assessment, 
however, the metacoordination process itself is underspecified across two dimensions: 
constituency and normativity. Each of these dimensions admits of differing possibilities in 
the way that they are to be substantively understood. We have here argued that 
consideration of elements of the ¶political decision context· from within which the 
metacoordination process is to occur should condition the way in which these dimensions 
are operationalised. We have highlighted three such elements of the decision context - 
criticality; institutional time point; and motivational landscape - and by reference to them 
have tried to show why the metacoordination process ought to be ¶FRQWH[W-GHSHQGHQW· In 
order for the idea of context-dependence to fit within a practical approach to legitimacy, 
it must itself be conditioned by a concern for political feasibility. In order always to be a 
normative theory of legitimacy, context-dependence must also respect two normative 
floors.  
 We do not suppose that all relevant elements of any political decision context have 
been covered here. Nor have we addressed how the different elements that we have 
covered here may interact with each other, and how this might affect the metacoordination 
process. For example, while we have suggested that a metacoordination process 
undertaken in advance of the creation of a given institution points toward the desirability 
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of an inclusive metacoordination constituency, we have also suggested that the 
motivational landscape may necessarily point in the direction of a more restricted 
constituency. There is then a question about what the implications are for 
metacoordination when these two factors interact, for example in the case where a new 
international institution, likely to be somewhat obscure to most people, is yet to be created.  
Because we have neither claimed to offer a comprehensive account of the 
individual elements of political decision contexts that may be relevant to the 
metacoordination process, nor addressed the issue of those elementV· interaction, we 
resultantly make here no claim to have offered a model that can tell us how best overall to 
think about the metacoordination process in any one instance. The aim of the paper has 
been far more modest, being merely to introduce and make a preliminary exploration of 
the idea of context-dependence. Nevertheless, the promise of context-dependence is that 
it presents the possibility of transcending theoretical binaries in thinking about legitimacy, 
emphasising instead the importance of plotting out an answer to what legitimacy demands 
by way of reference to the variable political circumstances in which we may find ourselves.  
 
 
